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Tax Cannibalization and State Government
Tax Incentive Programs
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
A major distinguishing feature of the American system of
fiscal federalism is the relative ease by which state govern-
ments can subsidize business activities through their tax
codes.1 There is no formal rule to that effect. Indeed, the
U.S. Supreme Court has struck down some tax incentives
that were only available to in-state businesses.2
However, the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on
a tax incentive structured to offer advantages to any
business so long as it makes specified investments in state.
Of course, it is hard to distinguish a tax break only for
in-state businesses from a tax break meant to encourage
out-of-state businesses to become in-state businesses. Thus,
when the Supreme Court accepted a case — Cuno — 10
years ago about the constitutionality of tax breaks meant to
encourage in-state economic activity,3 it seemed possible
that the Court would significantly limit state economic
development tax incentives. Yet the Court ruled that the
plaintiffs in Cuno lacked standing to challenge the state tax
incentives in question. Consequently, today, even for state
development tax incentives that might in theory be
vulnerable on the merits, the opponents of those incentives
have little prospect of challenging them because of the
problem of standing.4
By contrast, the European Union has a much stricter
regime governing state aid, at least formally.5 Congress
could in theory change the U.S. rules governing state tax
incentives, but there is little indication that it is contemplat-
ing doing so.
We explained in an earlier article how the current struc-
ture of the U.S. federal tax system distorts the choices of
1See generally Alan O. Sykes, ‘‘The Questionable Case for Subsidies
Regulation: A Comparative Perspective,’’ 2 J. Legal Analysis 473, 479
(2010) (‘‘Pending new developments in the doctrine, therefore, the
dormant commerce clause places little constraint on state subsidies
unless they can be characterized as a tax that discriminates against
interstate commerce’’).
2Walter Hellerstein and Dan T. Coenen, ‘‘Commerce Clause
Restraints on State Business Development Incentives,’’ 81 Cornell L.
Rev. 789, 794 (1996) (‘‘The Court’s treatment of state tax incentives
suggests that the constitutional suspicion surrounding such measures
is well justified. Over the past two decades, the Court has considered
four taxing schemes involving measures explicitly designed to encour-
age economic activity within the state. In each case, the Court
invalidated the measure’’). The four cases cited are New Energy Co. of
Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263 (1984); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S.
388 (1984); and Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429
U.S. 318 (1977).
3DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). Note that
the Sixth Circuit decision, which reached the merits, followed the
reasoning of Hellerstein and Coenen, supra note 2. Cuno v. Daimler
Chrysler Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004).
4For an example of a state intermediate appellate court striking
down an incentive meant to encourage in-state investment, see Cutler
v. Franchise Tax Board, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1247 (2012). It is hard to see
how the reasoning of that decision would not doom many other state
tax incentives, a point that has been noted by others. See, e.g., Kathleen
K. Wright, ‘‘California Resurrects RetroactiveTax Remedies,’’ StateTax
Notes, Jan. 28, 2013, p. 263 at 269.
5Sykes, supra note 1 at 491 (‘‘The EU system is by far the most
restrictive on the surface, although it too allows considerable state aid).
That the stricter EU system has at least some teeth is demonstrated by
the recent controversy wherein the EU charged Apple $14.6 billion for
taking advantage of illegal state aid from Ireland. See, e.g., Daniel N.
Shaviro, ‘‘Friends Without Benefits? Treasury and EU State Aid,’’ Tax
Notes, Sept. 19, 2016, p. 1681.
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states as to tax bases — to the federal government’s disad-
vantage.6 In this article, we explain how current federal
architecture also distorts the states’ choice of tax rates —
again to the disadvantage of the federal fisc.
To review our earlier argument, the higher a state’s tax
rate is on a shared base, say the corporate income tax base,
the more revenue the federal government loses from the
actions of taxpayers to avoid paying what is essentially a
combined federal-state tax rate. Put more concretely, here is
a very simple and simplified example.7 Suppose a corpora-
tion engages in additional profit shifting out of the United
States because of the additional 8.84 percent corporate tax
imposed by California. Say the corporation shields $1 mil-
lion in additional profits and California thus loses $88,400
of tax revenue as a consequence. The federal fisc potentially
loses $350,000, because the rate at the federal level is 35
percent.
As the example illustrates, because the federal govern-
ment levies much higher taxes on the shared bases of corpo-
rate and individual income than do any state governments,
the federal government suffers most of the harm when
state-level tax rates induce taxpayers to engage in additional
distortionary behaviors that shrink the shared tax base. Of
course, the higher federal tax rate induces far more profit
shifting and other distortionary behaviors than does the
lower state tax rate. Nevertheless, the additional distortion-
ary behaviors induced by the state tax rate can result in large
federal revenue losses by comparison to state revenue raised.
We estimate in our full article that, on the margin, the
federal government loses more than a dollar for every dollar
some state governments raise from their highest tax rates on
corporate income and on capital gains.8
There has not been much federal government interest in
the problem of state tax incentive programs, or in state tax
systems more generally, for quite a long time, with the
exception of the ongoing Quill saga and occasional bursts of
attention such as when the Supreme Court was pondering
Cuno. Abstract considerations of optimal fiscal federalism
simply do not seem to motivate Congress. By contrast, our
recent research on the tax cannibalization problem indicates
that the federal government is losing large amounts of
revenue because of choices made by the state governments
about their revenue systems, including the overuse of tax
incentives. We hope that this insight into the loss of federal
revenue provides Congress with more direct motivation to
reconsider state government tax incentive programs.
Tax Cannibalization and State Tax Incentives
The first step in understanding this article’s argument is
to step back to a simple case of horizontal competition.
Imagine that State A is competing with State B for a new
manufacturing plant to be built by Corporation X. Suppose
as well that the only revenue instrument available is the
corporate income tax and that the only tool the two states
have for luring mobile business activity is to reduce the
corporate income tax rate. And so, in that restricted
hypothetical world, at some point Corporation X will likely
play the two states off against each other, until the overall
corporate tax rate could potentially become rather low, at
least in the winning state. Indeed, in that simple world, the
resulting tax rate might be so low that the winning state, say
State A, might have a hard time providing basic services.
Further imagine that a few years later, States A and B
compete again for a new manufacturing plant, this time to
be built by Corporation Y. Needless to say, Corporation Y
will likely play the two states off against each other, hoping
to do at least as well as Corporation X. This time, however,
imagine that State A has a new plan. State A will not reduce
its overall corporate tax rate to attract Corporation Y; in-
stead, State A will award Corporation Y special tax incen-
tives that will, in effect, give the target corporation, but only
it, the same low rate as Corporation X. That way State A will
continue to raise revenue at a higher rate from other corpo-
rations — corporations that are less mobile.
This hypothetical explains the prevalence of tax incen-
tives in a relatively favorable light to illustrate how tax
incentives can in theory play a legitimate role in responding
to horizontal tax competition through differentiating be-
tween more and less mobile capital.9 Nevertheless, because
states must raise revenue to fund spending, states must at
some point choose between awarding more special tax in-
centives and keeping their regular tax rate higher, or award-
ing fewer special tax incentives while keeping the overall tax
rate lower.
In deciding between those two approaches for respond-
ing to tax competition, one might think in the abstract that
states should err toward having an overall lower rate and
broader base — that is, minimizing the use of special tax
preferences. The policy rationale for that approach is that
lower tax rates distort overall economic activity less, whereas
the empirical literature on tax incentives generally questions
their effectiveness.10
6Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism
in the United States,’’ Nw. U. L. Rev., Forthcoming. A draft of the
article is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2750933. We previously
discussed this article in ‘‘The Federal Government’s Power to Restrict
State Taxation,’’ State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547.
7We go through much more detail in the complete article, id.
8Id.
9There is much more to be said about this including about there
being many different kinds of economic inputs (labor as well as capital)
and their relative mobility changes over time. See generally David E.
Wildasin, ‘‘Fiscal Competition for Imperfectly-Mobile Labor and
Capital: A Comparative Dynamic Analysis,’’ 95 J. Pub. Econ. 1312
(2011).
10David Brunori, ‘‘State Tax Policy: A Political Perspective’’ (2011)
at 37-38 (summarizing research).
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However, as is well known, states award an enormous
amount of special tax incentives,11 often against tax bases
that they share with the federal government — especially
the corporate income tax. In order to meet their revenue
targets, states must therefore levy higher tax rates than they
would otherwise need in the absence of those special tax
incentives, meaning that the federal government suffers
more revenue loss from tax cannibalization than it would
otherwise.
Why are the states so blasé about the cost of higher tax
rates, and especially regarding state corporate income taxes?
To be sure, a large part of the reason may be the political
economy of state legislatures. Yet there is also a dollars-and-
cents reason regarding tax cannibalization. That is because it
is the federal government that suffers most of the loss from a
state government setting its general corporate income tax
rate higher than what is optimal for national welfare.12
So far, it may seem as though the driving force behind
the problem here is merely that the federal government has
a corporate income tax and that the states do also. But there
is more to the issue. Remember that one of the characteris-
tics of the American federal system — in contrast to other
systems — is the relative freedom that states have to use tax
incentives. That did not happen as a result of forethought.
Rather, the Supreme Court made challenging tax incentives
very difficult and Congress has not used its power to restrict
state tax incentives. Whether Congress should do so is
much debated. On the one side are those who argue, quite
plausibly, that state tax incentives for the most part are
ineffective at best and generally harmful.13 On the other
side are those who maintain, also plausibly, that there can be
positive roles for state tax incentives and further that
crafting a rule that sensibly distinguishes good incentives
from bad incentives is impossible.14
Yet heretofore absent from this debate has been the point
we have just made about tax cannibalization. Apart from the
debate over whether state tax incentives are beneficial or
harmful to state governments, because of tax cannibaliza-
tion, when state governments opt for higher general tax rates
accompanied by targeted tax incentives — rather than a
strategy of a broader base and lower rates for all — it is the
federal government that bears much of the costs. Conse-
quently, the issue of state tax incentives is not just a conflict
between ‘‘saving the states from themselves’’15 versus pre-
serving state autonomy. On top of those considerations, in
deciding the kind of rule that the federal government should
adopt, the federal government should also take into account
that that state tax incentives are enabling further cannibal-
ization of the federal government’s revenue.16
What Could the Federal Government Do?
What would Congress do if it were to act to limit the use
of state tax incentives?17 One approach would be to add the
value of state tax incentives back into the federal corporate
income tax base.18 That was the approach of the Distorting
Subsidies Limitation Act of 1999 (DSLA).19 Suppose Cor-
poration X was awarded targeted subsidies worth $1 mil-
lion; that $1 million would now be considered income to
the corporation. Assuming a 35 percent federal corporate
tax rate, Corporation X would now need to pay the federal
government $350,000 of its $1 million subsidy, a significant
drag on the value of the state subsidies. Of course, the rate
on such incentives could be much higher, say a special rate of
50 percent, because that is a form of income that the federal
government has decided is particularly disfavored. But even
just assessing the 35 percent federal corporate tax rate on the
value of awarded tax incentives would greatly alleviate the
tax cannibalization problem. Again, the rationale for such a
reform is that, as we have discussed above, targeted tax
11See, e.g., id. at 32-39, 100-101.
12Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘Tax Cannibalization,’’ supra note 6, at
20-25.
13See Brunori, supra note 10. The economist’s brief in Cuno sums
up that perspective as follows: ‘‘The economic evidence shows that
state tax incentives, at best, produce a zero-sum competition and, at
worst, result in a national economic loss.’’ Brief of Amicus Curiae
Economics and Public Policy Professors, 2006 WL 189794 at 8,
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
14See Sykes, supra note 1.
15Peter D. Enrich, ‘‘Saving the States From Themselves: Com-
merce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business,’’ 110
Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1996).
16At least one prominent commentator has indicated that she sees
a connection between the greater limits placed on the use of targeted
tax incentives in the EU and the fact that some EU jurisdictions choose
to compete on the basis of their general corporate tax rate. Deborah H.
Schenk, ‘‘The Cuno Case: A Comparison of U.S. Subsidies and
European State Aid,’’ 2006 Eur. St. Aid L.Q. 3, 7 (2006). If U.S. states
responded to a restriction on tax incentives similarly, then they would
reduce rates and mitigate the tax cannibalization problem.
17In an earlier column we explained why we think Congress would
have the power to enact limitations on the states’ use of tax incentives.
See Gamage and Shanske, supra note 6. In short, there could be (at
least) two compelling sources of power. First, Congress could use its
power over interstate commerce because state incentives manifestly
distort the economic decisions made by interstate commercial actors.
Second, Congress has the power to define its own tax bases and so the
taxing power (and 16th Amendment) could ground treating state tax
incentives as income.
18It should be noted that in some cases state subsidies are already
added back, but not all. For recent analysis of this issue, see Alan L.
Feld, ‘‘Federal Taxation of State Tax Credits,’’ Tax Notes, May 30, 2016,
p. 1243 at 1247 (‘‘State income tax credits ordinarily affect the federal
income tax of the recipient by reducing the state tax liability and any
corresponding federal deduction. They enter directly into the federal
income tax calculation only when the taxpayer receives something
more, in the form of a right to a refund from the state or the proceeds
of a sale of the credit’’).
19The Distorting Subsidies Limitation Act of 1999, H.R. 1060,
106th Cong. (1999).
Academic Perspectives on SALT
State Tax Notes, October 17, 2016 199
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C) Tax Analysts 2016. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
incentives allow states simultaneously to cannibalize the
federal base while not suffering consequences in terms of
horizontal competition.
One could argue that crafting such a restriction might
create a difficult line-drawing problem, as there is not nec-
essarily universal agreement as to what constitutes a tax
incentive as opposed to a tax-base definition rule.20 For
instance, a generous depreciation or depletion rule could be
devised as an industry-specific benefit, but could alterna-
tively be conceived as embodying a necessary tax judgment
as to how best to measure net income over a specific time
frame.
Further complicating matters, tax incentives could also
be grounded in rationales not regarding mitigating the cost
of horizontal externalities on account of having high tax
rates. For example, most states exempt food purchases from
their sales taxes, which functions as a benefit to the food
industry, but the motivation for those exemptions is to
mitigate the regressiveness of the sales taxes.
In order to avoid those line-drawing problems, a first cut
at a federal approach for reform could be to ban all state tax
incentives that, on their face, trade lower taxes for economic
investment in the state. If it were to turn out that such a law
was ineffective, then it could be revisited, but we suspect
that the political economy reasons that encourage states to
use narrow, targeted tax incentives will make a federal stat-
ute focused on facial state locational incentives reasonably
effective.21
If Congress did want to pass a broader measure, we think
the definition used in the DSLA would be a good start. The
DSLA defined a targeted subsidy as a subsidy ‘‘designed to
encourage any trade or business operation of such person to
locate in a particular governmental jurisdiction or to remain
in a particular governmental jurisdiction.’’22 That general
definition would not seem to sweep up state tax policies
such as the exemption of sales of food from the sales tax.23
A narrower rule here could forbid or limit state tax
incentives offered only against the corporate income tax, a
shared base, rather than against the property tax or the sales
tax.24 That would be a direct response to the problem of tax
incentives as a mechanism for states to keep tax rates high on
tax bases that they share with the federal government. Such
a rule would allow states to use tax incentives, which pre-
serves state autonomy and perhaps even enhances horizontal
competition. All that such a rule would in effect say to the
states is that if they want to offer tax breaks then they should
pay the full cost of that decision through reduction to a
non-shared tax base.25
Conclusion
Despite living in ivory towers, we do get enough oxygen
to know that congressional action on state tax incentives is
about as likely as Congress passing the Unicorn Habitat
Restoration Act of 2016 (or maybe less likely). So we will
end with a more limited aspiration: We hope that we have
begun to make the case that there are interesting fiscal facts
about our federal system that Congress does not know, but
could know and in so knowing could save the federal
government a lot of money.
It has been 20 years since Congress dissolved the Ameri-
can Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR).
Formed in 1959, ACIR issued dozens of important reports
and policy proposals, many of which substantially influ-
enced law reform. Even 20 years later, ACIR’s reports on
features of American federalism are still cited as invaluable
20We further discuss such line drawing difficulties in Gamage and
Shanske, ‘‘On Tax Increase Limitations: Part I — A Costly Incoher-
ence,’’ State Tax Notes, 2011, p. 813.
21For instance, the California Research and Development Credit is
only available for ‘‘research conducted in California.’’ Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code section 23609(c)(2). The R&D credit was the largest California
corporate tax expenditure for 2012. The cost of single-sales-factor
apportionment might have been larger but a calculation was appar-
ently not possible. Franchise Tax Board, ‘‘California Income Tax Ex-
penditures’’ (2012), available at http://bit.ly/2cr73ks.
22Proposed IRC section 4986(c)(1)(A)(i).The Distorting Subsidies
Limitation Act of 1999, H.R. 1060, 106th Cong. (1999).
23Another part of the DSLA seems promising as it would have
prohibited the use of the federal tax exemption on the interest of bonds
issued by state and local government in connection with projects
regarding locational incentives. Thus, if a state offered to issue bonds to
rebuild the roads near a manufacturing plant that also received loca-
tional tax incentives, then the interest on those bonds would not be
exempt from the federal income tax.
24A related reform might forbid single-sales-factor apportionment,
which has generally been adopted as an economic development tool.
See Enrich, supra note 15, at 462 (‘‘As sales factor adjustments become
a standard tool in the interstate competition for business, there seems
to be little reason why they should escape Commerce Clause scrutiny
of their distorting impact on the location of economic activity. Indeed,
they fall into the particularly suspect category of measures that target
their benefits on mobile businesses, because only taxpayers engaging in
significant interstate activity can reap the benefits or incur the costs of
sales factor adjustments’’); and Shanske, ‘‘A New Theory of the State
Corporate Income Tax: The State Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales
Tax Complement,’’ 66 Tax Law Rev. 305, 312-17 (2013).
25To be sure, money is fungible. A state could therefore dole out
property tax incentives while keeping its corporate income tax high.
That critique relies on the assumption that tax bases are politically
fungible. We think not. For the property tax for instance, property
taxes are generally reserved for local governments and so such a shift of
incentives would be complicated. Not that there could not be some
shifting, but we think some tamping down of the use of incentives is
the best one can reasonably hope for. After all, the Coenen and
Hellerstein argument, supra note 2, followed by the Sixth Circuit
decision in Cuno, essentially proscribes corporate income tax incen-
tives while permitting property tax incentives, though on different
(and we think less persuasive) grounds. Embracing that distinction as a
form of rough justice meant to reduce tax cannibalization seems more
appealing. Indeed, as explained by Sykes, supra note 1, the impact of
the greater restrictions on state aid in the EU has not eliminated tax
incentives so much as reduced them through creating additional legal
and administrative hurdles.
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resources — resources that have not been updated for 20
years.26 It has of course been more than 50 years since the
Willis Committee Report specifically considered interstate
taxation.27 Maybe the next time that a crisis forces Congress
to consider state fiscal affairs there might also be some
thought given to building knowledge infrastructure.
26Bruce D. McDowell, ‘‘Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations in 1996: The End of an Era,’’ 27 Publius: The Journal
of Federalism 111, 113-14 (1997).
27Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
of the Committee on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce, H.R. Rep. 1480, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964).
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